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Guarantees in with-profit and unitised with
profit life insurance contracts: fair valuation
problem in presence of the default option∗
Laura Ballotta, Steven Haberman and Nan Wang
Faculty of Actuarial Science and Statistics, Cass Business School
City University London
Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to apply contingent claim theory to
the valuation of the type of participating life insurance policies com-
monly sold in the UK. The paper extends the techniques developed by
Haberman et al. (2003) to allow for the default option. The default
option is a feature of the design of these policies, which recognizes
that the insurance company’s liability is limited by the market value
of the reference portfolio of assets underlying the policies that have
been sold. The valuation approach is based on the classical contingent
claim pricing “machinery”, underpinned by Monte Carlo techniques
for the computation of fair values. The paper addresses in particular
the issue of a fair contract design for a complex type of participating
policy and analyzes in detail the feasible set of policy design parame-
ters that would lead to a fair contract and the trade-offs between these
parameters.
1 Introduction
Participating contracts of various types make up a significant part of the
life insurance market of many countries including the US, Japan, Australia,
Canada and several members of the European Union. The modelling, val-
uation and pricing of these contracts are important subjects for scientific
∗The financial support from the Actuarial Research Club at Cass Business School and
its corporate members is gratefully acknowledged.
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analysis. This is because of the need by actuaries for appropriate and ro-
bust methods of internal financial risk management; the need by insurance
companies to demonstrate solvency and the ability to pay claims (and hence
benefits); the need to offer customers a “fair price” and be able to demon-
strate this; and the need to measure profitability. The task, however, is made
difficult by the nature of these life insurance contracts which incorporate a
wide range of guarantees and option-like features.
In recent years, a series of studies have applied classical contingent claim
theory, building on the pioneering work of Brennan and Schwartz (1976)
on unit-linked policies, to different types of participating contracts: see, for
example, Bacinello (2001, 2003), Grosen and Jørgensen (2000, 2001), Jensen
et al. (2001), Miltersen and Persson (1999) and Persson and Aase (1997).
In this paper, our approach is to consider the most common policy design
used in the UK for unitised with profit contracts and use classical contin-
gent claim methodology to solve the valuation problem related to this con-
tract. In particular, the policy design under examination incorporates both
a reversionary-type bonus and a terminal bonus and hence differs from that
considered by other authors. The paper is a companion to Haberman et al.
(2003) but with the added feature of the default option which is discussed in
more detail in section 3.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
section 3 describes the valuation framework and the equilibrium condition
for fair valuation, considering the separate claims of the policyholders and
the equityholders. Section 4 provides the numerical results and section 5
provides some concluding comments.
2 Model of a life insurance company with
participating contracts
The aim of this section is to set up a simple valuation model for the liabilities
of a life insurance company implied by participating policies. Assume that at
time t = 0 the insurance company acquires an asset portfolio A and finances
this portfolio with the (single) premium, P0, received from a policyholder
and with paid-in capital, E0, as illustrated in the company’s balance sheet in
Table 1. In return for the payment of the single premium, the policyholder is
entitled to a fixed guaranteed benefit, together with the so-called reversionary
bonus which is added periodically (i.e. a variable component reflecting the
individual policyholder’s smoothed share of the insurance company’s prof-
its), and a second variable component, which is based on the final surplus
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At time 0 Assets Liabilities
A0 L0 = P0 = θA0 single premium
E0 = (1− θ)A0 equity capital
A0 A0
At time t Assets Liabilities
A (t) L (t) policyholder claim
E (t) equity capital
A (t) A (t)
Table 1: Balance sheet for the policy contract.
earned by the insurance company. We describe the guaranteed payoff and
the reversionary bonus as constituting the policy reserve P , whilst the second
variable part represents the so-called terminal bonus, R. All three compo-
nents are payable at maturity or prior death of the policyholder. Depending
on the policy design, elements of the three components could be payable if
the policyholder surrenders the policy, prior to maturity. However, in this
analysis we ignore both the risk from surrenders and from mortality.
An inspection of the “building blocks” of such a participating policy re-
veals that we can regard these contracts as a sequence of embedded options
written on the asset portfolio A (which, from now, we call the reference port-
folio), whose market value can be determined within the classical contingent
claim pricing framework.
Consider a competitive market with continuous trading, and assume that
the market is frictionless, i.e. that there are no taxes, no transaction costs,
no restrictions on borrowing and short sales, and all securities are perfectly
divisible. In such a context, let
A be the reference portfolio backing the policy; this is assumed to be 100%
composed by equity and to follow the traditional geometric Brownian
motion:
dA (t) = rA (t) dt+ σA (t) dWˆ (t) ,
under the risk-neutral probability measure Pˆ, where r ∈ R+ is the
risk-free rate of interest and σ ∈ R+ is the portfolio volatility;
θ be the proportion of the initial reference portfolio financed by the poli-
cyholder, so that (1− θ) is the proportion of the portfolio financed by
the equityholders; hence, θ is a cost allocation parameter. As we will
note later, θ may be also interpreted as the leverage of the company,
or a parameter governing the distribution of the financial risk among
the policyholder and the equityholders;
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rG be the fixed guaranteed rate;
β be the participation rate of the policyholder in the returns generated by
the reference portfolio;
rP (t) be the interest rate credited to the policyholder’s account, including
both the guaranteed benefit and the reversionary bonus;
γ be the terminal bonus rate (participation rate in the company’s surplus
at maturity);
T be the maturity date of the contract.
We now consider the participating contract in more detail. The policy-
holder enters the contract paying an initial single premium P0 = θA0, where
A0 is the initial value of the reference portfolio. In return, the policyholder
receives a benefit, P , which accumulates at rate rP (t), so that
P (t) = P (t− 1) (1 + rP (t)) t = 1, 2, ...T, (1)
P (0) = P0.
As the reversionary bonus rate is usually determined by a smoothing adjust-
ment to the rate of return on the policy’s reference portfolio, we consider a
scheme for the accumulation of the policy reserve based on the arithmetic
average of the last τ year returns on the portfolio A, so that
rP (t) = max
{
rG,
β
n
(
A (t)
A (t− 1)
+ ... +
A (t− n+ 1)
A (t− n)
− n
)}
, (2)
n = min (t, τ) ,
where τ is the length of the averaging period (taken to be 3 years throughout
this investigation)1. Thus, the rate credited to the policyholder account is
the greater of the guaranteed rate, rG, and the arithmetic average of the last
τ period returns on the reference portfolio, multiplied by the participation
rate β.
At the claim date of the contract, a terminal bonus is also paid based on
the final surplus earned by the insurance company; this is defined as γR(T ),
where
R (T ) = (θA (T )− P (T ))+ .
1Evidence from Needleman and Roff (1995), Chadburn (1998), and the recent Asset
Share Survey by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (2001) shows that the scheme under consider-
ation is one of the smoothing mechanisms commonly used by insurance companies in the
UK. Other possibilities include the geometric average of the last τ period returns on A,
and schemes based on the concept of a smoothed asset share (see also Haberman et al.,
2003, for further details).
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If, at maturity, the insurance company is not capable of paying the poli-
cyholder’s account, P (T ), then the policyholder takes those assets that are
available, while the equityholders “walk away” empty-handed (i.e. the equi-
tyholders have limited liability).
3 Equilibrium condition for fair valuation
Given the contract specifications described in the previous section, we now
turn our attention to the issue of determining the value of the life insurance
policy in a market consistent manner, and in such a way that the contribu-
tions from the stakeholders of the life insurance company (i.e. the premium
P0 paid by the policyholder, and the equity capital E0 provided by the equi-
tyholders) are fair with respect to the value of the benefits that they entitle
the stakeholders to receive. By fair, we mean that these contributions do not
leave room for arbitrage opportunities to arise. In other words, the policy-
holder receives value for the money paid in the form of the actual premium,
but at the same time, the insurer is not offering the benefits too cheaply,
compromising in this way the position of the equityholders.
These considerations imply that the two sides of the contract, i.e. the
policyholder and the equityholders, need to be considered simultaneously for
the market to be in equilibrium. Consequently, in the following section we
describe the details of these two claims on the company’s assets and derive
a condition under which the market equilibrium is achieved with respect to
both the policyholder and the equityholders.
3.1 Stakeholders’ claims and no arbitrage in the mar-
ket
This section analyzes the structure of the claims of the policyholder and
the equityholders implied by the specification of the participating policy de-
scribed in section 2 (in particular by equations 1 and 2), beginning with the
specification of the liability of the company towards the policyholder.
• Policyholder’s claim:
Based on the model introduced in the previous section, and referring in
particular to Table 1, we consider the overall payoff that the policyholder is
entitled to receive at the expiration of the contract. This is the liability, L,
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of the insurance company at maturity, which can be described as follows:
L (T ) =


A (T ) if A (T ) < P (T )
P (T ) if P (T ) < A (T ) < P (T )
θ
P (T ) + γR (T ) if A (T ) > P (T )
θ
.
In a more compact way, we can write this as:
L (T ) = P (T ) + γR (T )−D (T ) ,
where
D (T ) = (P (T )−A (T ))+
represents the payoff of the so-called default option.
Applying risk-neutral valuation, it follows that the premium to be charged
to the policyholder should satisfy the following condition in order to be fair,
i.e. in order to clear any arbitrage opportunities from the market:
P0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [P (T ) + γR (T )−D (T )] , (3)
where Eˆ denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure
Pˆ. Alternatively
P0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [P (T )] + γe−rT Eˆ [R (T )]− e−rT Eˆ [D (T )] ,
which we can write, in an obvious notation, as
P0 = VP (0) + γVR (0)− VD (0) . (4)
• Equityholders’ claim:
As shown in the balance sheet in Table 1, the equityholders at maturity
can claim
E (T ) =


0 if A (T ) < P (T ) (limited liability)
A (T )− P (T ) if P (T ) < A (T ) < P (T )
θ
A (T )− P (T )− γR (T ) if A (T ) > P (T )
θ
,
or
E (T ) = (A (T )− P (T ))+ − γR (T ) .
This implies that the fair contribution to the company’s capital should satisfy
the following:
E0 = e
−rT
Eˆ
[
(A (T )− P (T ))+ − γR (T )
]
= e−rT Eˆ
[
(A (T )− P (T ))+
]
− γVR (0) .
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Note that
P (T )−D (T ) = A (T )− (A (T )− P (T ))+ .
Hence,
E0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [A (T )− P (T ) +D (T )]− γVR (0) . (5)
It follows that
(1− θ)A (0) = E0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [A (T )− P (T ) +D (T )]− γVR (0) ,
and therefore
P0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [P (T )−D (T )] + γVR (0) .
In other words, it is sufficient that equation (3) is satisfied for the policy
contract to be fair to both policyholders and equityholders.
3.2 The default option
In the previous section we introduced the default option with payoff
D (T ) = (P (T )− A (T ))+ ,
whose no-arbitrage value is given by:
VD (0) = e
−rT
Eˆ
[
(P (T )− A (T ))+
]
, (6)
where Eˆ denotes the expectation under the risk neutral probability measure
Pˆ.
Equation (6) highlights the point that the value of the default option
corresponds to the so-called unconditional shortfall expectation (see, for ex-
ample, Wirch and Hardy, 1999), the only difference being the probability
measure which is used to quantify the probability of default. In fact, as
equation (6) shows, in the case of the default option, calculations are carried
out in the risk neutral world. However, the choice between risk neutral and
real world probability of default depends on the purpose of the analysis: real
world default probabilities should be used for scenario analyses to calculate
potential future losses from defaults; whilst for the purpose of estimating the
impact of default risk on the pricing of instruments, as in the case treated
in this paper, risk neutral probabilities are the proper tool in order to carry
out consistent valuations.
In the light of these considerations, the value VD of the default option
can be regarded as the price of an insurance contract which would cover the
event of default. Maurer and Schlag (2002) observe that, if the life insurance
company had the possibility of transferring the default risk to a reinsurance
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company, the shortfall expectation could be seen as an important element
of the appropriate reinsurance premium. Equations (3) and (5) show that
this premium should be funded by the equityholders and not charged to the
policyholder.
Equations (6) also shows that the parameters affecting the value of the
default option, VD, are the contract parameters (θ, rG, β, τ), to the extent
that these parameters affect the policy reserve, P , and the market parameters
(σ, r). Given the structure of the contract under examination, the effect of
the market parameters is partially moderated by the length of the averaging
period, τ , the participation rate, β, but mainly by the parameter θ. As
mentioned in section 2, θ determines the allocation of the premium cost
among the two parties involved, the policyholder and the equityholders, and
in this sense it could be considered as a wealth distribution coefficient. On the
other hand, θ also determines the size of the debt in the company’s balance
sheet. The contribution coming from the policyholder could be regarded as
a long term loan, on which the company pays interest by crediting each year
the rate rP (t) to the policy reserve. The bigger the size of the loan, the
more resources the company has available to fund its investment strategies.
However, a bigger loan also means that more interest needs to be paid and
a larger sum needs to be repaid at maturity. This implies a higher chance
of default. In this sense, the parameter θ can be regarded as a leverage
coefficient.
These considerations suggest that the default option value, VD, captures
the riskiness of the contract in terms of both market risk and credit risk.
By market risk, we mean the risk arising from the possibility that market
variables will move in such a way that the value of a contract to the financial
institution, i.e. the insurance company, becomes negative. By credit risk,
instead, we mean the risk that a loss will be experienced (by the policyholder)
because of a default by the counterparty (the life insurance company) in a
derivatives (the sequence of options embedded in the policy) transaction.
3.3 Further analysis of the policy components
From equation (1), it follows that the policy reserve can be expressed as
P (T ) = P0
T∏
t=1
(1 + rP (t))
= θA0
T∏
t=1
(1 + rP (t)) = θP
U (T ) , (7)
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where PU (T ) is the “unlevered” policy reserve. By analogy, ifRU (T ) denotes
the “unlevered” terminal bonus, then
R (T ) = (θA (T )− P (T ))+
=
(
θA (T )− θA0
T∏
t=1
(1 + rP (t))
)+
= θ
(
A (T )− PU (T )
)+
;
= θRU (T ) ; (8)
whilst the default option payoff can be rewritten as
D (T ) = (P (T )− A (T ))+
=
(
θA0
T∏
t=1
(1 + rP (t))− A (T )
)+
= θ
(
PU (T )−
A (T )
θ
)+
. (9)
The three payoff equations (7)−(9) show that adding the leverage feature
to the model affects the structure of the default option, while the policy
reserve and the terminal bonus are unaffected, as the leverage coefficient
acts only as a rescaling factor.
This implies that the equilibrium condition (4) can be rewritten as:
P0 = e
−rT
Eˆ [P (T )] + γe−rT Eˆ [R (T )]− e−rT Eˆ [D (T )]
= θe−rT Eˆ
[
PU (T )
]
+ γθe−rT Eˆ
[
RU (T )
]
− θe−rT Eˆ
[(
PU (T )−
A (T )
θ
)+]
= θ
[
V U
P
(0) + γV U
R
(0)− e−rT Eˆ
[(
PU (T )−
A (T )
θ
)+]]
,
where V U
P
(0) is the fair value of the “unlevered” policy reserve and V U
R
(0)
is the fair value of the “unlevered” terminal bonus.
It follows that
A0 = V
U
P
(0) + γV U
R
(0)− e−rT Eˆ
[(
PU (T )−
A (T )
θ
)+]
.
It is clear that P0 increases as each of β, γ, θ and rG increase. Moreover
γ =
A0 − V
U
P
(0) + e−rT Eˆ
[(
PU (T )− A(T )
θ
)+]
V U
R
(0)
. (10)
9
Note that, if θ = 1 (so that there is no contribution from the sharehold-
ers), then
γ =
A0 − VP (0) + e
−rT
Eˆ
[
(P (T )− A (T ))+
]
VR (0)
= 1, (11)
since, as we observed before,
P (T )−D (T ) = A (T )− (A (T )− P (T ))+ .
The result expressed in equation (11) can be interpreted as a “wealth dis-
tribution effect”: if the policyholders are the only group contributing to the
financing of the portfolio backing the policy (i.e. if θ = 100%), they have the
right to receive the entire surplus of the company, and therefore they will fix
the terminal bonus rate at its maximum value (γ = 100%). The same fea-
ture has been observed in a similar context by Grosen and Jørgensen (2002).
Equation (10) also shows that γ increases as θ increases.
Finally we note that any insurer’s action on the leverage coefficient θ
affects only the way in which the financial risk is redistributed between the
company’s stakeholders. As the market becomes more volatile, in fact, the
insurance company might decide to change the exposure of new (and/or
existing) policyholders to the higher volatility of the reference portfolio by
changing the value of the parameter θ. This can be considered as a sort of
asset substitution effect which, however, does not affect the riskiness of the
portfolio backing the participating contract.
4 Numerical results
The path dependency implied by the structure of the reversionary bonus, as
described by equations (1) and (2), and the complexity of the components of
equation (3) mean that the investigation of the combination of parameters
satisfying the equilibrium condition (3) needs to be carried out making use
of numerical procedures. In particular, we use Monte Carlo techniques for
the estimation of the values of the policy components, i.e. VP (0), VR(0) and
VD(0). We implement the antithetic variates method for variance reduction
purposes. The solutions to the equilibrium condition are then sought using
the bisection method.
The Monte Carlo experiment is carried out by simulating 500,000 paths,
with each path composed by 20 steps, equivalent to one observation per year
over the life span of the contract (this is justified by the fact that the rate of
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return on the policy reserve, rP (t), is credited once a year). Unless otherwise
stated, the base set of parameters is:
A0 = 100; rG = 4%; θ = 0.75; γ = 0.7; r = 6%; σ = 0.15; T = 20 years.
In the following, we adopt a comparative statics approach and consider
the feasible fair combinations of parameters, where these are grouped two by
two, leaving all of the others fixed at their base values as stated above. We
first analyze how the contract parameters γ, rG and θ need to be readjusted
for the equilibrium condition to hold when the volatility of the reference
portfolio is allowed to change. Then, we study the impact on the terminal
bonus rate, γ, and on the minimum guarantee, rG, of a different allocation
of the financing of the reference portfolio between the policyholder and equi-
tyholders. Finally, we look at the trade-off between the guaranteed rate and
the terminal bonus rate.
We recognize that the parameter θ would be fixed at the start of an
individual contract. Also there would be an expectation (in the UK), among
policyholders, that the design parameters β and rG would not be altered
often and, if so, only gradually during the lifetime of a contract. However, it
would be common for the value of γ not to be guaranteed and indeed for its
value only to become known near to the maturity of an individual contract.
Finally, we observe that part of the analyses we present in the next sec-
tions (precisely, sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4) have been already considered by
other authors like Briys and De Varenne (1994) and Grosen and Jørgensen
(2002). However, our results extend their findings as these authors do not in-
clude the variable part of the guaranteed benefit in their model of the policy
reserve (i.e. they assume β = 0).
4.1 Impact of fund volatility on terminal bonus rates
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the possible combinations of the fund’s volatil-
ity, σ, and terminal bonus rate, γ, for which the equilibrium condition (3)
is satisfied. In particular, Figure 1 depicts isopremium curves corresponding
to different levels of the cost allocation coefficient, θ; Figure 2, instead, con-
siders the case of isopremium curves corresponding to different levels of the
guaranteed rate, rG.
Both figures show that, if θ < 1, as the fund volatility increases, the
participation rate for the terminal bonus, γ, has to be reduced for the equi-
librium condition to hold. However, for low values of the participation rate
β, we observe that the curves have a U-shape, which disappears in the plots
corresponding to higher values of β. From the equilibrium condition (4), it
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Figure 1: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of σ and γ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of θ equal to 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 1
from bottom to top.
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Figure 2: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of σ and γ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of rG equal to 2%, 4% and 6% from
top to bottom.
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follows that:
γ =
P0 − VP (0) + VD (0)
VR (0)
(12)
When σ increases, the value of both the policy reserve and the default option
increases. The first one tends to reduce the numerator in equation (12) and
hence γ, while the second tends to increase it. We note that the requirement
that γ > 0 implies that P0 + VD (0) > VP (0). Hence, VP (0) cannot increase
too much more than VD (0) does. For low β, the value at inception of the
terminal bonus is an increasing function of σ (see Haberman et al., 2003);
in this case, the default option looks like a vanilla put option as the policy
reserve is not very sensitive to the fund volatility and its size is not very
large, relatively. This mix determines the U-shape observed in the top panel
of both Figure 1 and Figure 2. For high β, the value of the terminal bonus
at inception decreases as the fund becomes riskier, as observed in Haberman
et al. (2003); despite this effect, the bottom panels of Figures 1 and 2 show
that γ decreases. This suggests that, as β is increased, the policy reserve
becomes the predominant term in equation (12). It is as if the policy reserve
“consumes” more and more from the reference portfolio; the default risk
increases as well but the participation in the surplus (the terminal bonus
rate) has to be cut in order to keep the contract feasible. This explanation
is confirmed by the detailed plots in Figure 3, which depict the behaviour of
both the fair values of the policy reserve and the default option as σ varies.
From Figure 1, we can also observe that the rate of change in γ increases
as θ is reduced (the curves become steeper). This effect is due to a “wealth
distribution effect”, in the sense that when θ becomes smaller, the equity-
holders become more dominant, and so they might need to reduce γ even
more in order to preserve the value of their share of the portfolio, i.e. to
maintain the equilibrium as described by equation (5). In fact, reductions
in θ make the conditions for redistributing the terminal bonus very difficult
to achieve. According to our model, the terminal bonus can be distributed
when AT > PT/θ. As θ decreases, this condition becomes very strong. This
is particularly true when β is high, as A and P become similar in terms of
their respective risk profiles. We recall from Haberman et al. (2003) that the
value at inception of the terminal bonus may be considered to be the pre-
mium for the probability mass in the right tail. Clearly, when θ decreases,
the barrier to be hit moves to the right, thereby reducing the probability
mass.
Figure 2 highlights the peculiar behaviour of the isopremium curves cor-
responding to a guaranteed rate equal to 6%, i.e. the assumed risk-free rate
13
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of interest2. We observe, in fact, that for this level of rG, the above mentioned
U-shape of the curves for β = 0.1 and β = 0.5 is even more accentuated. For
β = 0.7, again it disappears. The detailed plots show that, for low values
of the participation rate β, combined with high guaranteed rates, rG, there
exists a critical value of σ, say σ¯, such that, for σ < σ¯, any marginal increase
in the volatility has an impact on the value of the terminal bonus VR (see
also Figure 8 in section 4.3), such that the terminal bonus rate γ needs to be
reduced in order to preserve the fairness of the contract. For σ > σ¯, instead,
the risk of default, as measured by VD, has a magnitude such that the life
insurance company has to increase the participation rate in the final surplus,
γ, in order to justify the same level of the premium (note that in this case θ is
fixed at 75%), for a contract in which the policy reserve accumulates almost
at the risk-free rate but that has a non-zero probability of default attached.
It should be observed, in fact, that for a low participation rate β, very little
of the fund volatility is inherited by the policy reserve which, consequently,
accumulates almost at the fixed rate rG (see Figure 8 in section 4.3).
4.2 Impact of fund volatility on the guaranteed rate
In Figure 4, we represent isopremium curves corresponding to different com-
binations of σ and rG for fixed values of the cost allocation coefficient θ.
Figure 5 depicts the same scenario but for different choices of the terminal
bonus rate γ.
As both Figures show, when β is fixed at low values, there exists a σˆ,
such that, for σ < σˆ, a decrease in σ requires a higher rG for the premium
to be fair compared to the benefits being promised. For σ > σˆ, instead, the
pattern is reversed, in the sense that an increase in σ requires a higher rG. On
the other hand, for high values of β, we observe that in both figures there is
a change of concavity and an inversion of the trend, in the sense that now rG
is a monotone decreasing function of σ (actually, if β = 0.5 this happens for
θ ≤ 0.75; if β = 0.7 it happens for θ ≤ 0.90, as can be observed in Figure 4).
The observed decreasing pattern of the guaranteed rate, rG, is as expected.
As σ increases, in fact, the life insurance company faces a higher default risk
as the value of its assets is more volatile and the value of the policyholder’s
claim increases. This is even more accentuated if the participation rate β is
fixed at a high level. Hence, the insurer is forced to reduce rG in order to
2We note that newly issued policies generally offer a minimum guaranteed rate below
the market prevailing interest rate. However, the scenario of guarantees which lie above
the current market rate of interest is well known in practice for the case of policies that
have been issued in the past, in the light of the recent occurrence of separate periods of
inflation and periods of falling interest rates in many industrialized economies.
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Figure 4: Feasible set for the asset’s volatility and the minimum guarantee. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of θ equal to 0.20, 0.50, 0.75 and 1
from bottom to top.
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preserve its solvency. Further, as the plots show, this situation is the same
for different capital structures, i.e. different θ, which is consistent with the
Modigliani and Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The U shape
which we observe for low values of β, instead, is explained by the fact that
VP (0) is not very sensitive to changes in the market volatility because of
the low participation rate. Hence, the policyholder will buy the contract
only if the guaranteed rate is attractive enough (and he/she receives some
compensation for the low participation in asset returns implicit in the policy
design). As β is low, the risk coming from the variable part of the policy
reserve, P (t), is limited.
We also note from Figure 4 that the rate of change in rG increases as θ
decreases (steeper curves). This again is a “wealth distribution effect”: as
θ decreases, the shareholders become the main group (contributing to the
balance sheet) and therefore they try to preserve their share of the value of
the portfolio. Since, in this case, γ is fixed, as well as β, the only design
parameter on which they can act is the guaranteed rate, rG. On the other
hand, this decrease in θ corresponds to a reduction in the premium paid by
the policyholder and, consequently, an increase in σ is accompanied by a
corresponding fall in the guaranteed rate offered, rG.
4.3 Impact of fund volatility on the cost allocation co-
efficient
Figures 6 and 7 represent the feasible set of fair combinations of the reference
portfolio’s volatility and the leverage coefficient, θ. From both Figures, we
observe that, in general, θ is an increasing function of σ.
More precisely, both figures show that this is the case for β = 0.5, β = 0.7
and rG = 4%. The reason for the observed pattern follows from the arbitrage
principle: when σ increases, the value of the option embedded inside the
structure of the policy reserve increases; consequently, the premium paid by
the policyholder to purchase such an option has to increase.
Figure 6 presents a first exception to this trend in the top panel, corre-
sponding to the case of the participation rate β = 0.1, especially for γ = 0.9.
Observing this particular isopremium curve, we note that for σ > 0.15, θ
decreases as σ increases. This suggests that for values of the volatility higher
than 15%, the contract is too risky. For this reason, the life insurance office
needs to reduce the leverage in its liability structure.
Another exception to the general trend is presented in Figure 7, which
shows that when the guaranteed rate is above or equal to the risk-free rate
17
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Figure 6: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of σ and θ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of γ equal to 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 from
bottom to top.
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of interest (i.e. rG ≥ r)
3, θ is clearly a decreasing function of σ, when the
participation rate β is fixed at a low value. In fact, as already observed,
in such a situation the policy reserve is not very sensitive to changes in
the market volatility. Figure 8 in fact shows that for β = 0.1, the policy
reserve accumulates almost at the guaranteed rate. However, if σ increases,
the default risk, as measured by the value of the default option, increases as
well. This turns the contract into a product that earns a fixed rate of interest,
which is higher than the rate of interest offered by the market, with a non-
zero probability of default attached. In such a scenario, the life insurance
company may find that the risk which it is bearing is too high and it therefore
decides to reduce the leverage. Although, according to the Modigliani and
Miller theorem, this does not change the value of the firm’s assets, it does
reduce the amount of the policyholder’s claim.
Further evidence is presented in Figure 9, in which we plot the market
value of the entire policy, i.e.
VP (0) + γVR (0)− VD (0) , (13)
against the volatility of the reference portfolio. For β = 0.1, we observe that,
as rG increases above the 6% level, the market value of the contract becomes
a decreasing function of σ, implying that the value of the default option is
predominant. Since equation (13) is the right hand side of the equilibrium
condition (3) and P0 = θA0, the leverage coefficient has to decrease as well.
As β increases, this feature is observed only for rG = 8% in the panel cor-
responding to β = 0.5, while it disappears in the panel corresponding to
β = 0.7. As Figure 8 shows in more detail, when β increases, the policy
reserve is positively affected by increases in σ, compensating in this way for
the increased risk of default.
4.4 Impact of the cost allocation parameter on the ter-
minal bonus rate
From Figures 10 and 11, we observe that γ is an increasing function of θ. This
effect has also been observed by Grosen and Jørgensen (2002) and it is due to
the fact that, if policyholders are the only contributors to the establishment
of the reference portfolio, they are the sole group entitled to the surplus of
the company. Thus, as observed in section 3.3, when θ = 1, γ = 1. These
results confirm the monotonic relationship between γ and θ mentioned in the
discussion of equation (12).
3See footnote 2 for a comment on the relevance of the case where rG ≥ r.
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Figure 10: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values θ and γ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of σ equal to 0.10, 0.15, 0.20 and
0.25 from top to bottom.
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Figure 11: Feasible set for the cost allocation parameter, θ, and the terminal
bonus rate, γ. The curves in each panel correspond to the values of rG equal to
0%, 2%, 4% and 6% from top to bottom.
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The detailed plots of Figure 10 show that if σ increases, the curves move
towards the bottom-right corner and the spread between each volatility sce-
nario becomes more evident as the participation rate β increases (which is
consistent with what we have seen in section 4.1).
Further, in the top panel of Figure 10, we note that a lower bound is
implied for γ for each choice of σ, so that a fair contract does not exist for
some choices of γ. The lower bound depends on the volatility and is lower
for higher values of the volatility. In the last panel of Figure 10, we note that
the range of values, which the wealth distribution parameter θ can assume,
narrows in high volatility scenarios.
The same consideration arises from Figure 11 in the case of high guaran-
teed rates: the curves, in fact, move towards the bottom part of the panels,
or, in other words, the isopremium curves corresponding to higher levels of
rG are feasible only for lower values of the terminal bonus rate (this fea-
ture is explored in more details in section 4.6). We observe once again that
increases in the participation rate, β, produce the effect of moving the iso-
premium curves towards the bottom right corner of the axes: ceteris paribus,
either the policyholder pays a higher premium in return for the value of the
benefit which he/she receives, or the policyholder accepts a lower guarantee.
4.5 Impact of the cost allocation parameter on the
guaranteed rate
In Figures 12 and 13, we represent the feasible fair combinations of θ and rG
for different choices of σ and γ respectively. We note that in each plot, rG
is an increasing function of θ. This suggests that a high guaranteed rate is
chosen when the contribution from the policyholder predominates over that
from the equityholders.
In particular, in Figure 12 there is a cross-over feature that disappears for
higher values of the participation rate, β. For β = 0.1, there is a value of θ,
say θ¯, approximately equal to 0.5 such that for θ < θ¯, higher guaranteed rates
are chosen in lower volatility conditions than in higher volatility conditions.
For θ > θ¯, the situation is reversed and high guaranteed rates are chosen in
high volatility scenarios. For β = 0.5, the cross-over appears at the higher
level of θ¯ ∼= 0.9; while for β = 0.7 the cross-over disappears so that higher
guaranteed rates are chosen for lower values of volatility than for higher
values. This effect is due to the inversion of concavity that we have observed
in Figure 4, discussed in section 4.2.
Further, both figures show that, as β increases, the guaranteed rate is
lowered for any value of the market volatility (the curves move towards the
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Figure 12: Feasible set for the cost allocation parameter θ and the minimum
guarantee. The curves in each panel correspond to the values of σ equal to 0.10,
0.15, 0.20 and 0.25 from top to bottom at the left end of the θ scale.
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Figure 13: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of θ and rG. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of γ equal to 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90
from top to bottom.
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bottom-right corner); for β = 0.7 and for σ > 0.15, the leverage coefficient
needs to be approximately 1 in order for a positive guaranteed rate to be
feasible. When β increases, both the size of the policy reserve and its sen-
sitivity to the volatility increase; which means that the value of the default
option increases under this double effect. If we regard the value of the default
option as a measure of the default risk, then the last plot depicts a riskier
situation and compensation is sought through reductions of the guaranteed
rate (as shown in the bottom panels of both Figure 12 and Figure 13).
In Figure 13, we observe that when the terminal bonus rate increases,
the curves move towards the bottom right corner of each panel. This shows
that, in order to keep the same level of the guaranteed rate, the contribution
from the policyholder has to increase, as for higher γ they receive a higher
final benefit (which is consistent with what we have observed in section 4.2).
Alternatively, if we want to keep the wealth distribution rate, θ, unchanged
as γ increases, we need to reduce the level of the guarantee so that the value
of the overall benefit, received by the policyholder, is fair compared to the
premium paid.
4.6 Impact of the guaranteed rate on the terminal bonus
rate
The feasible set of fair combinations for the minimum guarantee and the
terminal bonus rate are shown in Figure 14 for different choices of θ, and in
Figure 15 for different volatility scenarios.
Both figures show the existence of a trade-off between the two parame-
ters, in the sense that low terminal bonus rates are associated with a high
minimum guarantee for the contract to be fair to both sides. In other words,
the benefit provided to the policyholder by a high guaranteed rate has to be
compensated by a low terminal bonus rate in order to preserve the allocation
of the financing of the reference portfolio between the two parties involved.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that, when the policyholder receives
a high guaranteed rate, it is unlikely that the conditions for the distribution
of the terminal bonus are met.
Figure 14 also shows that higher terminal bonus rates for fixed rG, or
higher guarantees for fixed γ are feasible only if the contribution from the
policyholder increases (as observed also in sections 4.4 and 4.5).
In Figure 15, we observe a cross-over feature in the panels corresponding
to β = 0.1 and β = 0.5, in the sense that there is a critical value of rG, r¯G
say, such that for rG < r¯G and fixed γ, reductions of the fund volatility cause
the guarantee to be increased in order to maintain the same premium. For
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Figure 14: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of rG and γ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of θ equal to 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1
from bottom to top.
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Figure 15: Isopremium curves over the range of possible values of rG and γ. The
curves in each panel correspond to the values of σ equal to 0.10, 0.15, 0.20 and
0.25 from top to bottom at the left end of the rG scale.
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rG > r¯G (and fixed γ), the situation is reversed: higher volatility scenarios
require a higher guaranteed rate. This cross-over feature is related to the
change of concavity that we have observed in Figure 5.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have applied a market-based valuation methodology for the
most common unitised with-profits life insurance contracts sold in the UK.
The contract design is also common in other European countries and Japan.
These contracts contain complex guarantees and option-like features, which
have not been analyzed yet in the literature. Specifically, we decompose
these contracts into a policy reserve, comprising the guaranteed benefit and
a periodically added reversionary bonus, a terminal bonus and a default
option.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the focus is on the fair design of these
contracts when surrender opportunities are ignored. The option to surren-
der would give the policyholder the possibility to leave the policy scheme
before maturity if this suits his/her needs; therefore, as shown by the theory
of American options, a participating contract offering such an opportunity
should be more valuable. However, it is common practice for life insurance
companies to apply penalties when the policyholder decides to leave the
scheme before the end of its term. Such charges could compensate for the
added value generated by the American-type feature.
The analysis presented in this paper does not also take account of the
mortality risk. Each benefit offered by the participating contract is in fact
paid to the policyholder provided that he/she survives till each payment
date. We, instead, assume that the policyholder will survive till the end of
the contract’s term with probability 1. In this respect, our paper provides a
more prudential pricing rule, in the sense that we provide a possible upper
bound for the life insurance liabilities.
Further, the model presented in this paper relies on a reference portfolio
composed only of equities. We recognize, however, that the common prac-
tice amongst life insurance companies is to fund participating contracts with
portfolios composed also of gilts, corporate bonds and instruments traded
in foreign markets, whose proportions are not fixed over the lifetime of the
contract, but change as the policy approaches maturity. A first attempt to
incorporate part of these features is currently in progress.
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